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Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem
in Degenerate Systems
Kaitong HU ∗ Zhenjie REN† Nizar TOUZI ‡
Abstract
In this paper we present a variational calculus approach to Principal-Agent problem
with a lump-sum payment on finite horizon in degenerate stochastic systems, such as fil-
tered partially observed linear systems. Our work extends the existing methodologies in
the Principal-Agent literature using dynamic programming and BSDE representation of the
contracts in the non-degenerate controlled stochastic systems. We first solve the Principal’s
problem in an enlarged set of contracts defined by a forward-backward SDE system given by
the first order condition of the Agent’s problem using variational calculus. Then we use the
sufficient condition of the Agent’s problem to verify that the optimal contract that we obtain
by solving the Principal’s problem is indeed implementable (i.e. belonging to the admissible
contract set). Importantly we consider the control problem in a weak formulation. Finally,
we give explicit solution of the Principal-Agent problem in partially observed linear systems
and extend our results to some mean field interacting Agents case.
Keywords: Stochastic Control of non-Markovian systems, Stochastic Maximum Principles,
path-dependent Forward-backward SDEs, Principal-Agent Problem, Contract Theory
MSC: 60H30, 91A23, 91A35
1 Introduction
Moral hazard is one of the prime risks of systemic instability and inefficiency, as already pointed
out by Adam Smith. Finding the optimal contract between two parties - The Principal and
the Agent, when the Agent’s effort cannot be observed therefore cannot be contracted upon,
is a classical moral hazard problem in microeconomics. Applications can be widely found in
corporate finance, portfolio management [4] and more recently energy transition [1, 2].
While the research on discrete-time models dated further back, the first continuous-time
model was proposed in the seminal work of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom [16], in which they study
a simplified model with lump-sum payment on finite horizon while assuming the Agent controls
only the drift of the state process. They show that the optimal contract should be linear in ag-
gregate output when the Agent has CARA utility functions with a monetary cost of effort. Their
work has been extended by Scha¨ttler and Sung [29, 30], Sung [31, 32], Mu¨ller [23, 24], Hellwig
and Schmidt [15]. Later Williams [33], Cvitanic´, Wan and Zhang [8] use the stochastic maxi-
mum principle and forward-backward stochastic differential equations (abbreviated FBSDE) to
characterize the optimal compensation for more general utility functions.
Many different continuous-time models have been proposed in the past few decades, no-
tably the one introduced by Sannikov in his seminal paper [28]. He considered Principal-Agent
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problem on infinite horizon with continuous payment while allowing Principal to fire or retire
the Agent at any time. From a mathematical perspective, his approach sheds light on the
contracting relationship in Princpal-Agent’s problem using dynamic programming and leads to
simple computational procedure to find the optimal contract by, in his case, solving an ordinary
differential equation.
More recently, Sannikov’s idea was reinterpreted and extended by Cvitanic´, Possama¨ı and
Touzi [7] to a more general set-up with a more direct and easier approach. We shall illustrate
their contribution in the following toy model. Denote by ξ the contract paid at the end of a
finite time interval [0, T ]. Let’s consider the following optimization for the Agent:
max
α
E
[
ξ(Xα)−
∫ T
0
c(αt)dt
]
, where dXαt = dWt − αtdt.
The crucial observation in [7] is that both the contract ξ and the Agent’s best response α∗[ξ] can
be characterized by the following backward stochastic differential equation (in short, BSDE, for
readers not familiar with BSDE we refer to [10,25], and in particular to [9] for the applications
on the contract theory):
dYt = −c∗(Zt)dt+ ZtdWt, YT = ξ, where c∗(z) = max
a
{
az − c(a)},
namely, ξ = YT and α
∗
t [Z] = argmaxa
{
aZt − c(a)
}
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. This induces a natural
(forward) representation of the couple (ξ, α∗[ξ]):


ξ = Y Y0,ZT := Y0 −
∫ T
0
c∗(Zt)dt+
∫ T
0
ZtdWt
α∗t [ξ] := α
∗
t [Z] = argmax
a
{
aZt − c(a)
}
, for all t ∈ [0, T ]
for some (Y0, Z),
and this neat representation transforms the once puzzling principal’s problem to be a classical
stochastic control problem, namely,
max
ξ
E
[
U
(
X
α∗[ξ]
T − ξ
) ]
= max
Y0,Z
E
[
U
(
X
α∗[Z]
T − Y Y0,ZT
) ]
.
This idea of representation is further applied to study the case where the Principal can hire
multiple Agents e.g. [11], [12] or Agent facing multiple Principals e.g. [21], [18] using the formu-
lation of mean field games (as for the mean field game we refer to the seminal paper [20] and
the recent books [5] and [6]).
However, the method relies on an important hypothesis: the stochastic system is non-
degenerate. More specifically, at the heart of the dynamic programming approach to Principal-
Agent problem lies the BSDE representation of the contract as shown in the above example,
which requires the non-degeneracy of the system.
It is well known that degenerate stochastic systems appear naturally in partially observed
systems when we replace the non-observable part of the system by the filtered process, i.e. the
conditional law of the unobservable given the observable, see e.g. [3]. One of the simplest cases
of partial observed system is system with parameter uncertainty. This is studied by Fernandes
and Phelan [14], Williams [34], then by Prat and Jovanovic [27], which inspires and motivates
this work. To illustrate the idea, consider the following process
dBt = (µ + βt)dt+ σdWt, (1.1)
where β is the control of the Agent and µ represents a unknown parameter of the system which
is called the time-invariant productivity. The common priors on µ are normal with mean m0
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and variance V0. Using Bayes’ formula and replace µ by the posteriors, which depend on Bt
and the cumulative effort At :=
∫ t
0 βsds, we get the following controlled system:
dBt =
(
Vt
V0
m0 +
Vt
σ2
(Bt −At) + βt
)
dt+ dIt,
where Vt =
σ2V0
σ2+V0t
is the posterior variance and (It)t≥0 is a F
B-adapted Brownian motion called
the innovation process. The partially observed state process (1.1) becomes now a degenerate
controlled system with a new degenerate process (At)t≥0. Since the process A is not observable
by the Principal, it cannot be contracted upon. Indeed, to compute the posteriors on µ at time
t, one needs to know the Agent’s control β up to time t. The main difficulty is to find a dynamic
representation of the contracts but using only the observable part of the system, namely in the
above case the process B.
In this paper we consider general degenerate controlled system in a weak formulation, allow-
ing the drift and the volatility of the filtered process (i.e. degenerate part of the system, denoted
throughout the paper by X) be controlled by the Agent. We assume that the observable part
of the system (i.e. non-degenerate part of the system, denoted throughout the paper by the
process B) is controlled by the Agent only via the drift. We give the first order condition of
the Agent’s optimal control when he is given a contract. The first order condition is described
by a path-dependent FBSDE. Contrary to the FBSDE literature, by path-dependent we mean
the coefficients of the FBSDE dependent on the path of the forward process. In the Principal-
Agent problem, the dependency mainly comes from the Agent’s cost function and the contract.
The wellposedness of these kinds of FBSDE is of independent interest and is studied in the
accompanying paper [17]. Our strategy is to solve the Principal’s problem first over the set of
contracts described by the FBSDE given by the first order condition of the Agent’s problem.
The contracts described by the FBSDE may not necessarily be implementable, i.e. the optimal
control of the Agent’s problem may not exist. The implementability is then checked by the
sufficient condition of the optimality of the Agent’s problem.
The main contribution of the paper is to provide a way to solve the Principal-Agent’s problem
when only part of the state variables can be contracted upon, which is crucial when the system is
partially observed. The rest of the paper is organised as follow. In section 2 we state our moral
hazard problem in degenerated systems and give the main results of the paper. The proofs
of the results will be given in Section 3. In Section 4 we solve the Principal-Agent problem
in partially observed linear systems with explicit optimal contract and extend the result to a
specific mean-field interacting Agents case.
2 Principal-Agent Problem in Degenerate Systems
2.1 Preliminaries
Let Ω := C
(
[0, T ],Rd
)
be the canonical space and B the canonical process. Denote by F =
(FBt )0≤t≤T the associated filtration and P the Wiener measure. Let A be a compact convex
subset of some finite dimensional space. Let
b : [0, T ] × Ω× Rn ×A→ Rd, b(·, a) F-optional for any a ∈ A,
η : [0, T ]× Ω× Rn ×A→ Rn, η(·, a) F-optional for any a ∈ A,
σ : [0, T ]× Ω× Rn ×A→Mn,d(R), σ(·, a) F-optional for any a ∈ A,
where Mn,d(R) denotes the set of n × d matrices with real entries. Throughout this paper
we shall be studying control problems in a weak formulation. Denote U the set of admissible
controls taking values in A. For any α ∈ U , under the standard global Lipschitz conditions of
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Assumption 2.5 below, let X be the unique strong solution of the following stochastic differential
equation
dXt = ηt(Xt, αt)dt+ σt(Xt, αt)dBt, (2.1)
for some given initial data X0.
Then we can define dPα|FT := EαT dP|FT where
EαT := exp
(∫ T
0
bt(Xt, αt) · dBt + 1
2
∫ T
0
|bt(Xt, αt)|2dt
)
. (2.2)
In the case where the above process is a positive martingale, by Girsanov theorem we can define
Wαt := Bt − B0 −
∫ t
0 bs(Xs, αs)ds, which is a d-dimensional Brownian motion under P
α and
which means that the canonical process B satisfies the following stochastic differential equation
dBt = bt(Xt, αt)dt+ dW
α
t . (2.3)
This defines the family of probability measures on Ω
P :=
{
Pα ∈ P(Ω) : α ∈ U
}
,
where P(Ω) is the set of all probability measures on Ω.
2.2 Problem Formulation
The Agent signs a contract, works for the Principal for a predetermined period T and receives
ξ at time T . A contract ξ is a FT -measurable random variable, which represents the payment
the Agent receives at time T . Let c : [0, T ]×Ω×A→ R be a measurable function representing
the Agent’s cost of effort at time t. Let kA : [0, T ] × Ω × A → R be a bounded F-optional
function and define KAT := exp
(
− ∫ T0 kAt (αt)dt) representing the Agent’s discount factor. The
Agent aims at choosing an optimal effort α ∈ U to optimize his utility when given a contract ξ
proposed by the Principal:
VA(ξ) := sup
α∈U
JA(α) := sup
α∈U
Eα
[
KAT ξ −
∫ T
0
KAt ct(αt)dt
]
, (2.4)
where Eα denotes the expectation under the probability measure Pα ∈ P defined previously.
For any contract ξ, denote M∗(ξ) ⊂ U the set of optimal controls of the Agent’s problem.
The Principal on the other hand takes benefits from the outcome of the controlled process
and pays the Agent accordingly. Also, the Agent’s participation is conditioned on having his
expected return above his reservation utility R, in other words: VA(ξ) ≥ R. In all, the Principal
choose a contract among the following set of contracts in order to optimize her own utility:
Ξ =
{
ξ FT -measurable : sup
P∈P
EP
[
ξ2
]
<∞ and VA(ξ) ≥ R
}
. (2.5)
We will call the contracts in Ξ the implementable contracts. In the case where the Agent has
more than one optimal control, we follow the standard convention that the Agent chooses the
one that is the best for the Principal. Let kP : [0, T ]×Ω→ R be a bounded F-optional function
and define KPT := exp
(
− ∫ T0 kPt dt), which represents the discount factor of the Principal. She
aims at solving the following optimization
VP = sup
ξ∈Ξ
sup
α∗∈M∗(ξ)
Eα
∗
[KPT U(BT − ξ)],
where the function U : R → R is a given non-decreasing and concave utility function and we
use the convention sup ∅ = −∞.
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Remark 2.1. One of our goals is to generalize the setting of the paper [7] by Cvitanic, Possama¨ı
and Touzi, in which they consider the following system
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
σr(X,βt)(λr(X, ar)dr + dWr), t ∈ [0, T ].
The drift of the dynamic needs to be in the range of the volatility, which means the system
cannot be degenerate.
2.3 Motivation
The main motivation of our formulation is to tackle the Principal-Agent problem in a partially
observed linear system. Using the above notation, the canonical process B represent the ob-
servable process, observed by the Agent and the Principal at the same time. The degenerate
part of the system described by the process X represents the filtered process.
More precisely, let ν = (α, β) ∈ U be an admissible control. Let Xˆ be the unique strong
solution of the following linear stochastic differential equation representing the unobservable
part of the system:
dXˆt = (η(t)Xˆt + αt)dt+ σ(t)dWt, Xˆ0 = µ, (2.6)
where µ a unobservable random variable independent of W assumed to be Gaussian with mean
and variance m0 and V0, respectively. In addition, we assume that the Principal and the Agent
both know m0 and V0. The functions η and σ are deterministic. Furthermore, the observable
part of the system is generated by the noisy signal
dBt = (h(t)Xˆt + βt)dt+ dW
ν
t , (2.7)
where W ν is a Brownian motion independent of W and h a deterministic function.
Notice that the couple (Xˆ,B) is Gaussian and therefore so is the conditional distribution
L(Xt|Bt), which is characterized by its mean and variance. Denote Xt := Eν
[
Xˆt|FBt
]
and
Vt := E
ν
[
(Xˆt −Xt)2|FBt
]
for any given admissible control ν. The dynamics of the process X
and V are given by the Kalman-Bucy filter as shown in the following proposition, the proof can
be found in [3, Chapter 2].
Proposition 2.2. Let ν = (α, β) be an admissible control process. We have the following filter
system: {
dXt =
(
η(t)Xt + αt
)
dt+ h(t)V (t)dIνt , X0 = m0, (2.8)
dBt =
(
h(t)Xt + βt
)
dt+ dIνt B0 = 0, (2.9)
where V is the solution to the ODE:
V˙ (t) = 2η(t)V (t)− h2(t)V 2(t) + σ(t), V (0) = V0. (2.10)
The process Iν defined by
Iνt := Wt +
∫ t
0
h(s)
(
Xˆs −Xs
)
ds = Bt −
∫ t
0
(h(s)Xs + βs)ds (2.11)
is a FB-Brownian motion under Pν, and is called the Innovation process.
Clearly under the filtered system (2.8)-(2.9), everything is fully observable, but the system
itself becomes degenerate. We aim at solving the following Principal-Agent problem with the
convention sup ∅ = −∞:
VP = sup
ξ∈Ξ
sup
β∗∈M∗(ξ)
Eβ
∗
[BT − ξ], (2.12)
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where β∗ ∈M∗(ξ) is the optimal response of the Agent given the contract ξ, namely
β∗ = argmax
β∈U
Eβ
[
ξ −
∫ T
0
c(t, βt)dt
]
. (2.13)
Section 4.1 below provides an explicit solution for this problem by applying the subsequent
results of the Section 2.4.
Remark 2.3. Our model is inspired and motivated by the model proposed in [27], where the
observable process is described by
dBt = (µ+ βt)dt+ dWt,
which is actually a special case of our framework, when η = σ = α = 0. Another difference
is that they consider an infinite horizon problem, where the contract is given in the form of
continuous salary whereas in our framework, the contract consists in a lump-sum payment at
the end of the contract.
More generally speaking, one can consider the following partially observed system:
dBt = bt(Xˆt, βt)dt+ dWt
dXˆt = ηt(Xˆt, αt)dt+ σt(Xˆt, αt)dW˜t,
where B and Xˆ represent as before the observable process and the unobservable process, re-
spectively. One way to transform the system into an equivalent but fully observable system is to
replace the unobservable part by its (unormalized) conditional law described by Zakai equation.
In this paper, we shall mainly focus on the finite dimensional case.
Remark 2.4. The moral hazard framework of Principal-Agent problem is also frequently called
the second best. The first best corresponds to the case where the Principal and the Agent have
the same information. It is typically assumed that the Principal dictates the Agent’s actions.
Mathematically, the problem becomes a stochastic control problem for a single individual - the
Principal. It is well-known that in non-degenerate systems under some mild conditions, the first
best coincides with the second best in terms of Principal’s value when the Agent’s criterion is risk
neutral. However, in a partially observed system, the result no longer holds true in general, even
in the risk-neutral case. Consider the following example where there is no observable process.
The unobservable process follows a SDE:
dXˆt = αtdt+ dWt with Xˆ0 ∼ N (m0, V0) independent of FW .
Clearly, the filtered process is given by Xt = m0 +
∫ t
0 αsds. The Principal aims at optimizing
his utility function:
VP = sup
ξ∈Ξ
sup
α∗∈M∗(ξ)
Eα
∗
[XˆT − ξ],
where α∗ is the optimal response of the Agent given the contract ξ, namely
α∗ = argmax
α∈U
Eα
[
ξ − 1
2
∫ T
0
α2tdt
]
.
In the second best case, the Principal has no information and can therefore only offer constant
contracts. Agent has no incentive to work and therefore α ≡ 0. Taking into account the partic-
ipation constraint the optimal contract is a constant payment R at time T where R is Agent’s
reservation value. The Principal’s value in this case is m0 −R. In the first best case, the Prin-
cipal observes the Agent’s action and therefore the filtered process can be contracted upon. For
simplicity, let’s consider only linear contracts, i.e. ξ = cXT + d. The Agent’s optimal control
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is α∗ ≡ c with participation constraint Tc22 +m0c ≥ R− d. As for the Principal, for any given
linear contract ξ we have
Eα
∗
[XˆT − ξ] = Eα∗
[
XˆT − 1
2
∫ T
0
(α∗t )
2dt
]
− Eα∗
[
ξ − 1
2
∫ T
0
(α∗t )
2dt
]
≤ m0 + T
2
−R.
The inequality becomes equality when c = 1 and d = R−m0 − T2 , in which case the Principal’s
value is increased by T2 comparing to the moral hazard case.
2.4 Main Results
For presentation simplicity, we assume that the Agent’s discount factor KAt is equal to 1 for
all t ∈ [0, T ]. All the main results can be generalised without much difficulty to the case with
KAt = exp
(
− ∫ t0 kAs (αs)ds) where kA : [0, T ] × Ω × A → R is a bounded F-optional function.
Throughout this paper, we shall impose the following conditions on these coefficients.
Assumption 2.5. The maps b, σ, η are C2 in x. Moreover, there exists a constant L > 0 and
a modulus of continuity ̟ : [0,∞) → [0,∞) such that for φ = b, σ, η, ∂xb, ∂xσ, ∂xη, P-almost
surely
|φt(x, a)− φt(x′, a′)| ≤ L|x− x′|+̟(|a− a′|) for all t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rn, a, a′ ∈ A
and for φ = b, σ, η, P-almost surely
|∂xxφt(x, a)− ∂xxφt(x′, a′)| ≤ ̟(|x− x′|+ |a− a′|) for all t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rn, a, a′ ∈ A.
The following assumption ensures that all weak controls Pα ∈ P are equivalent and that
high order error terms in the variational calculus can be ignored in the non-linear system case.
Assumption 2.6. The Dole´ans-Dade exponential Eα defined in (2.2) is a positive martingale
for all α ∈ U . Furthermore, if the controlled system is not linear, namely not in the form of
(2.6)-(2.7), there exists p > 2 such that sup
α∈U
E[(EαT )p] <∞.
We aim to solve the Agent’s problem (2.4) by variational calculus. In the following, for p ≥ 1,
Pα ∈ P and T > 0, denote
H
p
T (P
α) :=

Z F− adapted : ‖Z‖HpT (Pα) := Eα
[∫ T
0
|Zt|pdt
] 1
p
< +∞

 .
For (t, ω, x, x′, a, a′, p, q, z) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω × (Rn)2 × A2 × Rn × Mn,d(R) × Rd, define the
Hamiltonian:
Ht(x, x
′, a, a′, p, q, z) := p ·(ηt(x, a)+σt(x, a)bt(x′, a′))+Tr[qσ⊺t (x, a)]+z ·bt(x, a)−ct(a). (2.14)
Implicitly, at time t the Hamiltonian may depend on the path of canonical process B·∧t up
to time t. In the following, we will use frequently the partial derivative ∂aH, ∂xH, which are
derivatives with respect to x and a but not x′, a′.
Theorem 2.7 (Necessary Condition). Assume that Assumption 2.5 and 2.6 hold true. For a
contract ξ ∈ Ξ, let α∗ ∈M∗(ξ). Then the following FBSDE

dYt = ct(α
∗
t )dt+ ZtdW
α∗
t YT = ξ, (2.15)
dPt = −∂xHt(Xt,Xt, α∗t , α∗t , Pt, Qt, Zt)dt+QtdWα
∗
t PT = 0, (2.16)
dBt = ∂zHt(Xt,Xt, α
∗
t , α
∗
t , Pt, Qt, Zt)dt+ dW
α∗
t B0 = 0, (2.17)
dXt = ∂pHt(Xt,Xt, α
∗
t , α
∗
t , Pt, Qt, Zt)dt+ σt(Xt, α
∗
t )dW
α∗
t X0 = x0, (2.18)
7
where α∗ verifies
α∗t = argmax
a∈A
Ht(Xt,Xt, a, α
∗
t , Pt, Qt, Zt) for all t ∈ [0, T ],Pα
∗ − a.s. (2.19)
has an F-adapted solution, denoted by
(Y ∗, Z∗, P ∗, Q∗,X∗) ∈ H2T (Pα
∗
)5.
Remark 2.8. 1. In the case where η = σ = 0 and b does not depend on x, our formulation
is reduced to the framework of Principal-Agent problem studied in [7] in the uncontrolled
diffusion case, where the state equations are not degenerate. The FBSDE given in Theorem
2.7 reduces to the BSDE (2.15), which is the same representation of the contract under
the optimal probability using the dynamic programming approach. To see that, note that
the Hamiltonian in this case becomes
Ht(a, z) = zbt(a)− ct(a)
and together with the definition of the optimal control given in (2.19), the equation (2.15)
can be written as
dYt = Ht(α
∗
t , Zt)dt+ ZtdBt
= max
a∈A
Ht(a, Zt)dt+ ZtdBt, YT = ξ,
which is the canonical representation of the contract ξ given in [7, Definition 3.2].
2. Since we are working on the weak formulation of stochastic control, it is not surprising
that the necessary condition we obtain here does not coincide with the standard stochastic
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (see e.g. [26,35]). Comparing to the standard result, the
forward-backward system has an extra backward equation (2.15). The process Y in (2.15)
indeed characterizes the value function. The adjoint process (2.16) and the forward one
(2.18) are similar to those appearing in the standard stochastic maximum principle.
3. The contract ξ appearing in the terminal condition of (2.15) may be path-dependent. To
the best of our knowledge, the well-posedness of such FBSDE has not yet been studied in
the literature. For further details, we refer the readers to the accompanying paper on the
path-dependent FBSDEs [17].
4. Another way to see how to obtain the FBSDE (2.15)-(2.18) is to conduct formally the vari-
ational calculus by introducing a new state process L representing the change of measure,
namely
dLt = bt(Xt, αt)dBt
and rewrite the Agent’s problem as following:
VA = sup
α∈U
E
[
LT ξ −
∫ T
0
Ltct(αt)dt
]
,
where the controlled system becomes{
dXt = ηt(Xt, αt)dt+ σt(Xt, αt)dBt X0 = x0,
dLt = Ltbt(Xt, αt)dBt L0 = 1.
The standard Hamiltonian associated with the above control problem is given by
Hˆt(x, l, a, p, q, z) = ηt(x, a) · p+Tr[qσ⊺t (x, a)] + l(zbt(x, a)− ct(a)). (2.20)
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The adjoint equations associated with X and L are given by{
dPt = −∂xHˆt(Xt, Lt, αt, Pt, Qt, Zt)dt+QtdBt PT = 0, (2.21)
dYt = −∂lHˆt(Xt, Lt, αt, Pt, Qt, Zt)dt+ ZtdBt YT = ξ . (2.22)
The process (Y,Z) in (2.22) is actually the equation (2.15) and if we define Pˆt =
Pt
Lt
and
Qˆt =
Qt
Lt
− Ptbt(Xt,αt)Lt , then the process (Pˆ , Qˆ) satisfies exactly the equation (2.16).
However, there are a few problems in this approach. First of all, since the coefficients
of the control system (2.21)-(2.22) are not Lipschitz, to our best knowledge, one cannot
directly apply the stochastic maximum principle. Our method provides a way to overcome
this problem. Secondly, the newly introduced state variable L is not observable, the contract
and the optimal control of the Agent should not depend on L. And finally, note that the
convexity of the Hamiltonian (2.20) can be satisfied in very few situations due to the term
lzbt(x, a), which makes it tricky to get a useful sufficient condition for the Agent’s problem.
Now we give a sufficient condition for the Agent’s problem. Define the functional
G(t, ω, x, x′, a, a′, p, q, z) := Ht(x, x′, a, a′, p, q, z) + (x− x′)qbt(x, a)
+p
(
σt(x, a)bt(x, a)− σt(x, a)bt(x′, a′)− σt(x′, a′)bt(x, a)
)
.
Theorem 2.9 (Sufficient Condition). Let Assumptions 2.5 and 2.6 hold true. Let (Y ∗, Z∗, P ∗, Q∗,X∗)
be a solution to the system (2.15)-(2.18), where α∗ satisfies (2.19). If (x, a) ∈ Rn × A 7→
Gt(x,X∗t , a, α∗t , P ∗t , Q∗t , Z∗t ) is concave, α∗ is an optimal control for the problem VA(Y ∗T ).
We next focus on the Principal’s problem. Based on the necessary and the sufficient condition
of the Agent’s problem, we consider the following sets of contracts:
Ξ :=
{
YT |Y0 ≥ R,Z ∈ Z
}
and Ξ := {YT |Y0 ≥ R,Z ∈ Z} ,
where Y is defined by the equation (2.15) and
Z :=
{
Z ∈ H2T (P) : ∃Pα ∈ P s.t. (2.16),(2.18) have an F-adapted solution (P,Q,X) in H2(Pα)3
}
,
Z :=
{
Z ∈ Z : Q satisfies the sufficient condition given in Theorem 2.9
}
.
Clearly we have Ξ ⊂ Ξ ⊂ Ξ. Further, we introduce the enlarged optimization of the Principal.
V¯P := sup
Y0≥R
sup
Z∈Z
J¯P (Y0, Z) := sup
Y0≥R
sup
Z∈Z
Eα
∗ [KPT U(BT − YT )] . (2.23)
Theorem 2.10. Assume that Assumption 2.5 and 2.6 hold true. Then VP ≤ V¯P . Moreover,
if the control problem V¯P has a solution Z
∗ which satisfies the sufficient condition given in
Theorem 2.9, then VP = V¯P and ξ = Y
∗
T is an optimal contract for VP .
3 Proofs
Before giving the proof of the necessary condition, we give the following martingale representa-
tion theorem which we shall need in a moment.
Lemma 3.1 (Martingale Representation). Let (Mt)0≤t≤T be a stochastic process with decom-
position
dMt = htdt+ dWt,
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where h is a FM -adapted process such that E
[
exp
(∫ T
0 htdWt − 12
∫ T
0 h
2
tdt
)]
= 1. Then for any
FM martingale ξ = (ξt)0≤t≤T , there exists a F
M -adapted process f such that
∀t ∈ [0, T ], ξt = ξ0 +
∫ t
0
fsdWt, P− a.s.
Proof Let (ξt)0≤t≤T be a F
M -martingale. For t ∈ [0, T ], define
Lt := e
−
∫ t
0
hsdWs−
1
2
∫ t
0
h2sds.
Clearly (Lt)0≤t≤T is a positive uniformly integrable martingale. By Girsanov’s theorem, denote
Q the probability under which M is a Brownian motion, we have dQdP
∣∣∣
FMt
= Lt. By Bayes’
rule, ξL is a F
M martingale under Q. Since M is now a Brownian motion under the probability
Q, by the martingale representation theorem, there exists a FM -adapted process k = (kt,F
M
t ),
0 ≤ t ≤ T , such that ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ξtLt = ξ0 +
∫ t
0 ksdMs. Finally, by Ito’s formula, we have
dξt = d(Lt · ξt
Lt
) = − ξt
Lt
LthtdWt + LtktdMt − Lthtktdt = (Ltkt − ξtht)dWt.
The following lemma gives an estimate on the error of the first order approximation of the
difference between the solution of (2.1) given two different control α and α′.
Lemma 3.2. Let α, α′ be two control processes and X, X ′ be the corresponding solution of
(2.1). Denote ∆α := α−α′ and ∆X := X −X ′. Let ∆Xˆ be the solution of the following linear
SDE with initial condition ∆Xˆ0 = 0:
d∆Xˆt =
(
∂xηt(X
′
t, α
′
t)∆Xˆt + ∂aηt(X
′
t, α
′
t)∆αt
)
dt+
(
∂xσt(X
′
t, α
′
t)∆Xˆt + ∂aσt(X
′
t, α
′
t)∆αt
)
dBt.
(3.1)
Then for any p ≥ 2, there exists K > 0 depending only on p, T and the coefficients η, σ of the
equation such that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Xˆt −∆Xt|p
]
≤ KE
[∫ T
0
|∆αt|2pdt
]
,
where the expectation is taken under the Wiener measure.
Proof In this proof, for the simplicity of the notation, we shall always use C to denote some
strictly positive constants, which may vary from line to line. By Assumption 2.5 and Taylor
expansion, we note that
|ηt(Xt, αt)− ηt(X ′t, α′t)− ∂xηt(X ′t, α′t)∆Xt − ∂aηt(X ′t, α′t)∆αt| ≤ L(|∆αt|2 + |∆Xt|2),
|σt(Xt, αt)− σt(X ′t, α′t)− ∂xσt(X ′t, α′t)∆Xt − ∂aσt(X ′t, α′t)∆αt| ≤ L(|∆αt|2 + |∆Xt|2).
Therefore, by triangle inequality, we get
|ηt(Xt, αt)−ηt(X ′t, α′t)−∂xηt(X ′t, α′t)∆Xˆt−∂aηt(X ′t, α′t)∆αt| ≤ L(|∆αt|2+|∆Xt|2+|∆Xˆt−∆Xt|),
|σt(Xt, αt)−σt(X ′t, α′t)−∂xσt(X ′t, α′t)∆Xˆt−∂aσt(X ′t, α′t)∆αt| ≤ L(|∆αt|2+|∆Xt|2+|∆Xˆt−∆Xt|),
for some other constant L > 0.
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By Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality and Jensen inequality, we have
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Xˆt −∆Xt|p
]
≤ CE
[∫ T
0
(
|∆αt|2p + |∆Xt|2p + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Xˆt −∆Xt|p
)
dt
+
(∫ T
0
(|∆αt|2 + |∆Xt|2 + |∆Xˆt −∆Xt|)2dt
)p/2 ]
≤ CE
[∫ T
0
(
|∆αt|2p + |∆Xt|2p + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Xˆt −∆Xt|p
)
dt
]
.
By Gro¨nwall inequality, we get
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Xˆt −∆Xt|p
]
≤ C exp (CT )E
[∫ T
0
(|∆αt|2p + |∆Xt|2p) dt
]
. (3.2)
Now we shall estimate the moments of ∆X. Again, for all p ≥ 2, by Burkholder-Davis-Gundy
inequality and Jensen inequality, we have
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Xt|p
]
≤ CE
[∫ T
0
(|∆αt|p + |∆Xt|p) dt+
(∫ T
0
(|∆αt|+ |∆Xt|)2dt
)p/2 ]
≤ CE
[∫ T
0
(
|∆αt|p + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Xt|p
)
dt
]
.
By Gro¨nwall inequality, we get
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Xt|p
]
≤ C exp (CT )E
[∫ T
0
|∆αt|pdt
]
. (3.3)
Finally, combing (3.2) and (3.3), we get
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Xˆt −∆Xt|p
]
≤ CE
[∫ T
0
|∆αt|2pdt
]
,
where C is a constant depending on p, T and the coefficients of the SDE (2.1).
We shall now give the proof of Theorem 2.7 in the non-linear system case. Note that in the
linear case, ∆X and ∆Xˆ defined in the above lemma are the same, which means that there will
not be any high order error terms in the variational calculus. Therefore, the estimation of the
error terms in step 5 of the following proof will not be necessary for linear system.
Proof of Theorem 2.7 For simplicity, we shall only prove the case where n = d = 1. In
higher dimensional case, the proof is essentially the same. Let ξ be an implementable contract
such that there exists an F-adapted control α∗ which optimizes the Agent’s expected value. We
denote the corresponding state variable X∗.
Step 1. Introduce the dynamic version of the value function Yt := E
α∗
t
[
ξ − ∫ Tt cs(α∗s)ds]. One
can check straightforward that (Mt)0≤t≤T :=
(
Yt −
∫ t
0 cs(α
∗
s)ds
)
0≤t≤T
is an F-martingale under
the probability Pα
∗
. By the martingale representation in Lemma 3.1, there exists an F-adapted
process Z, such that for all t ∈ [0, T ]
Mt = JA(α
∗) +
∫ t
0
ZsdW
α∗
s . (3.4)
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By Assumption 2.5 and [9, Theorem 9.3.5], Z ∈ H2T (Pα
∗
).
Step 2. Next we perform a variational calculus around the optimal control α∗. Let α ∈ U and
for all t ∈ [0, T ] denote ∆αt = αt − α∗t . Define αǫt := α∗t + ǫ∆αt and denote the corresponding
state variable by Xǫ. Since the control set U is assumed to be convex, we have αǫ ∈ U . Denote
δαt = ε∆αt, ∆Xt =
Xεt−X
∗
t
ǫ and δXt = ε∆Xt. As ξ = YT , we have
JA(α
ǫ) = Eα
ε
[
ξ −
∫ T
0
ct(α
ε
t )dt
]
= Eα
ǫ
[
JA(α
∗) +
∫ T
0
ct(α
∗
t )dt+
∫ T
0
ZtdW
α∗
t −
∫ T
0
ct(α
ǫ
t)dt
]
= Eα
ǫ
[
JA(α
∗) +
∫ T
0
−δctdt+
∫ T
0
Zt
(
dWα
ε
t + (bt(X
ε
t , α
ε
t )− bt(X∗t , α∗t ))dt
)]
where δct := ct(α
ǫ
t) − ct(α∗t ). By the definition of the set of admissible contracts (2.5), we
know that
∫ ·
0 ZtdW
αε
t is a true martingale under P
αε . Denote Eε the Radon-Nikodym derivative
between Pα
ε
and Pα
∗
, namely
Eε := exp
(∫ T
0
(bt(X
ε
t , α
ε
t )− bt(X∗t , α∗t ))dWα
∗
t −
1
2
∫ T
0
(bt(X
ε
t , α
ε
t )− bt(X∗t , α∗t ))2dt
)
.
Note that since b is bounded, Eε is in Lp for all p ≥ 1. Applying Girsanov theorem and together
with Taylor expansion on b, we have
JA(α
ǫ)− JA(α∗)
= Eα
∗
[
Eε
∫ T
0
(− δct + Zt(bt(Xεt , αεt )− bt(X∗t , α∗t )))dt
]
= εEα
∗
[
Eε
∫ T
0
(− ∂act(α∗t )∆αt + Zt(∂abt(X∗t , α∗t )∆αt + ∂xbt(X∗t , α∗t )∆Xˆt) +Rεt/ε)dt
]
,
where ∆Xˆ is the solution of the SDE (3.1) with initial condition ∆Xˆ0 = 0 and
Rεt := −
(
δct − ∂act(α∗t )δαt
)
+ Zt
(
bt(X
ε
t , α
ε)− bt(X∗t , α∗t )− ∂abt(X∗t , α∗t )δαt + ∂xbt(X∗t , α∗t )δXt
)
+εZt∂xbt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )(∆Xt −∆Xˆt). (3.5)
We claim and will prove in Step 5 that limε→0
1
ε2
Eα
∗
[
Eε ∫ T0 |Rεt |dt] <∞. Then,
JA(α
ǫ)− JA(α∗)
ε
= Eα
∗
[
Eε
∫ T
0
(− ∂act(α∗t )∆αt + Zt(∂abt(X∗t , α∗t )∆αt + ∂xbt(X∗t , α∗t )∆Xˆt))dt
]
+O(ε).
(3.6)
Step 3. In order to continue the variational calculus above, we need to introduce the adjoint
process P and Q satisfying (2.16). Let (P,Q) be the unique strong solution in H2(Pα
∗
)of the
following BSDE:
dPt = −∂xHt(X∗t ,X∗t , α∗t , α∗t , Pt, Qt, Zt)dt+QtdWα
∗
t , PT = 0,
where H is the Hamiltonian given in (2.14). Note that the above BSDE is a linear BSDE and
since PT = 0, P and Q are in H
p(Pα
∗
) for all p ≥ 2.
Step 4. We are going to continue the variational calculus above and obtain (2.19). By Itoˆ’s
formula, we have
d(Pt∆Xˆt) =
(
− Zt∂xbt(X∗t , α∗t )∆Xˆt +∆αt
(
Pt(∂abt + bt∂aσt)(X
∗
t , α
∗
t ) +Qt∂aσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )
))
dt
+
(
Qt∆Xˆt + Pt(∂xσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )∆Xˆt + ∂aσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )∆αt)
)
dWα
∗
t .
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Using the fact that PT = 0 and ∆Xˆ0 = 0, we get
0 =
∫ T
0
(
− Ztbt(X∗t , α∗t )∆Xˆt +∆αt
(
Pt(∂abt + bt∂aσt)(X
∗
t , α
∗
t ) +Qt∂aσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )
))
dt
+
∫ T
0
(
Qt∆Xˆt + Pt(∂xσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )∆Xˆt + ∂aσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )∆αt)
)
dWα
∗
t . (3.7)
Note that∫ T
0
(
Qt∆Xˆt + Pt(∂xσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )∆Xˆt + ∂aσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )∆αt)
)
dWα
∗
t
=
∫ T
0
(
Qt∆Xˆt + Pt(∂xσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )∆Xˆt + ∂aσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )∆αt)
)
(bt(X
ε
t , α
ε
t )− bt(X∗t , α∗t ))dt
+
∫ T
0
(
Qt∆Xˆt + Pt(∂xσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )∆Xˆt + ∂aσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )∆αt)
)
dWα
ε
t . (3.8)
Denote
Rˆεt :=
(
Qt∆Xˆt + Pt(∂xσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )∆Xˆt + ∂aσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )∆αt)
)
(bt(X
ε
t , α
ε
t )− bt(X∗t , α∗t )). (3.9)
We claim and will prove in Step 5 that limε→0
1
εE
α∗
[
Eε ∫ T0 |Rˆεt |dt] <∞.
Inserting the equation (3.7) and equation (3.8) into (3.6), we get
JA(α
ǫ)− JA(α∗)
ε
= Eα
∗
[
Eε
∫ T
0
(
− ∂act(α∗t )∆αt + Zt∂abt(X∗t , α∗t )∆αt
+∆αt
(
Pt(∂abt + bt∂aσt)(X
∗
t , α
∗
t ) +Qt∂aσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )
))
dt
]
+O(ε).
Now, let ε goes to 0 and by dominated convergence theorem, we obtain
0 ≥ lim
ǫ→0
(
JA(α
ǫ)− JA(α∗)
ε
)
= Eα
∗
[ ∫ T
0
∆αt
(
− ∂act(α∗t ) + Zt∂abt(X∗t , α∗t )
+Pt(∂abt + bt∂aσt)(X
∗
t , α
∗
t ) +Qt∂aσt(X
∗
t , α
∗
t )
)
dt
]
= Eα
∗
[∫ T
0
∂aHt(X
∗
t ,X
∗
t , α
∗
t , α
∗
t , Pt, Qt, Zt)∆αtdt
]
Since ∆α is arbitrary, if α∗ is an optimal control, (2.19) holds true.
Step 5. Finally we shall complete the proof by proving the claim we made on (Rεt )t∈[0,T ] and
(Rˆεt )t∈[0,T ]. The first term in (3.5) is clearly uniformly bounded by Cε2 for some positive
constant C, since the controls are bounded.
By Ho¨lder’s inequality, we have
Eα
∗
[
Eε
∫ T
0
Zt
(
bt(X
ε
t , α
ε)− bt(X∗t , α∗t )− ∂abt(X∗t , α∗t )δαt + ∂xbt(X∗t , α∗t )δXt
)
dt
]
≤ Eα∗

Eε(∫ T
0
Z2t dt
)1
2
(∫ T
0
(
bt(X
ε
t , α
ε)− bt(X∗t , α∗t )− ∂abt(X∗t , α∗t )δαt + ∂xbt(X∗t , α∗t )δXt
)2
dt
)1
2


≤ ‖Eε‖p‖Z‖H2
T
(Pα∗)E
α∗
[(∫ T
0
(
bt(X
ε
t , α
ε)− bt(X∗t , α∗t )− ∂abt(X∗t , α∗t )δαt + ∂xbt(X∗t , α∗t )δXt
)2
dt
) q
2
] 1
q
≤ CT sup
ε
‖Eε‖p‖Z‖H2
T
(Pα∗ )E
α∗
[(∫ T
0
(
∆α2t +∆X
2
t
)
dt
) q
2
] 1
q
ε2,
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where 1p +
1
q =
1
2 with p given in Assumption 2.6. As shown in the proof of Lemma 3.2,
∆X ∈ HpT (Pα
∗
) for all p ≥ 2, therefore, the second term of the right hand side of (3.5) is also
bounded by Cε2 for some positive constant C. As for the third term in (3.5), again by Lemma
3.2, using the definition ε∆Xt = X
ε
t −X∗t , we have
Eα
ε
[∫ T
0
ε|Zt∂xbt(X∗t , α∗t )(∆Xt −∆Xˆt)|dt
]
≤ CE
[
Eˆε
∫ T
0
ε|Zt(∆Xt −∆Xˆt)|dt
]
≤ C‖Eˆε‖p‖Z‖H2
T
(P)E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|ε∆Xt − ε∆Xˆt|q
] 1
q
≤ C sup
ε
‖Eˆε‖p‖Z‖H2
T
(P)E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆αt|2q
] 1
q
ε2,
where 1p +
1
q =
1
2 with p given in Assumption 2.6 and Eˆε is the Radon-Nikodym derivative
between Pα
ε
and the Wiener measure P, namely
Eˆε := exp
(∫ T
0
bt(X
ε
t , α
ε
t )dBt −
1
2
∫ T
0
b2t (X
ε
t , α
ε
t )dt
)
,
which has finite moment uniformly in ε by Assumption 2.6. Finally to complete our proof, we
shall prove limε→0
1
εE
α∗
[
Eε ∫ T0 |Rˆεt |dt] < ∞ where Rˆεt is defined by the equation (3.9). Note
that αε − α∗ = ε∆α and as shown in the proof of Lemma 3.2,
Eα
∗
[∫ T
0
|Xεt −X∗t |pdt
]
≤ CE
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xεt −X∗t |p
]
≤ CE
[∫ T
0
|∆αt|pdt
]
εp
for some constants C. Therefore, by Assumption 2.5, using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and
Ho¨lder inequality, we have
Eα
∗
[
Eε
∫ T
0
|Rˆεt |dt
]
≤ CEα∗
[∫ T
0
(|Pt|4 + |Qt|4 + |∆Xt|4 + |∆αt|4) dt
]1
2
Eα
∗
[(∫ T
0
(|∆Xt|2 + |∆αt|2)dt
)2] 14
ε,
for some constant C. Therefore, limε→0
1
εE
α∗
[
Eε ∫ T0 |Rˆεt |dt] <∞.
Proof of Theorem 2.9 Let α ∈ U and denote the corresponding state variable byX. Denote
∆α := α − α∗ and ∆X = X −X∗. By the same computation as in the proof of Theorem 2.7
and the concavity of G, we have
JA(α)− JA(α∗)
= Eα
[∫ T
0
(− δct + Zt(bt(Xt, αt)− bt(X∗t , α∗t )))dt+ PT∆X
]
= Eα
[∫ T
0
(Gt(Xt,X∗t , αt, α∗t , Pt, Qt, Zt)− Gt(Xt,X∗t , αt, α∗t , Pt, Qt, Zt)
−∂xGt(X∗t ,X∗t , α∗t , α∗t , Pt, Qt, Zt)∆Xt
)
dt
]
≤ 0.
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Proof of Theorem 2.10 Since the enlarged Principal’s problem has a larger admissible
contract set, the Principal’s value is higher than the initial problem of the Principal. If V¯P
has an optimal solution ξ∗ such that the solution Q∗ of the FBSDE (2.15)-(2.18) satisfies the
sufficient condition given by Theorem 2.9, then we know that the control α∗ defined by (2.19)
is indeed the optimal control for the Agent’s Problem given this contract ξ∗. Therefore, ξ∗ ∈ Ξ
and consequently VP ≥ V¯P . Combined with the first statement of the theorem, we get VP = V¯P .
4 Applications
We shall make the following assumption throughout this section.
Assumption 4.1. The Agent’s cost function (t, b) 7→ c(t, b) is deterministic, strictly convex,
increasing and twice differentiable in b.
4.1 Principal-Agent Problem in Partially Observed Linear System
We return to the context in Section 2.3 and aim at solving the Principal-Agent problem (2.12)-
(2.13). In addition, we assume that the unobservable process Xˆ is non-affected by the Agent’s
control α. We recall that the controlled state variables follow (2.8)-(2.9) with α ≡ 0 and that
the associated Hamiltonian function is given by
H(t, x, b, p, q, z) :=
(
η(t)x− h(t)V (t)(h(t)x + b)
)
p−
(
h(t)x+ b
)
z + c(t, b).
The necessary condition by Theorem 2.7 becomes

dYt = c(t, β
∗
t )dt+ ZtdIt YT = ξ, (4.1)
dPt =
(
h(t)Zt − (η(t)− V (t)h2(t))Pt
)
dt+QtdIt PT = 0, (4.2)
dXt = η(t)Xtdt+ h(t)V (t)dIt X0 = m0, (4.3)
where
β∗t = argmin
b∈A
H(t,Xt, b, Pt, Qt, Zt). (4.4)
The above system describes the contracts under the optimal response of the Agent. The sufficient
condition can also be re-written under simpler form:
Theorem 4.2. Let (Y ∗, Z∗, P ∗, Q∗,X∗) be a solution to the system (4.1)-(4.2), where β∗ sat-
isfies (4.4). Define ξ := Y ∗T . Then β
∗ is an optimal control if
Q∗t
2h(t)
∈
[
0, inf
b∈A
{
∂2bbc(t, b)
}]
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.5)
In particular, in this case ξ ∈ Ξ.
Remark 4.3. We can also obtain the necessary and sufficient condition in the case of expo-
nential utility Agent, the proof and the hypothesis are slightly different, we shall detail them in
the Appendix.
Together with Theorem 2.10, we can solve the Principal’s problem explicitly.
Theorem 4.4. Let Assumption 4.1 hold true. Assume in addition that the function b ∈ B 7→
b− c(t, b) has a maximiser, denoted by β¯∗(t). Define
Z∗t = ∂bc(t, β¯
∗(t)) +
∫ T
t
e
∫ s
t
η(r)drh(s)∂bc(s, β¯
∗(s))ds.
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The optimal contract for the Principal’s problem is given by
ξ∗ = R+
∫ T
0
(c(t, β¯∗(t)) − Z∗t (h(t)X¯∗t + β¯∗(t)))dt+
∫ T
0
Z∗t dBt, (4.6)
where X¯∗t is the unique solution to (4.3) with innovation process I computed with β¯
∗ and the
Principal’s optimal expected utility is
VP = −R+
∫ T
0
(
β¯∗(t)− c(t, β¯∗(t))) dt+ ∫ T
0
h(t)m(t)dt,
where m(t) := m0e
∫ t
0
η(s)ds for t ∈ [0, T ].
Remark 4.5. It is immediately verified that the optimal contract (4.6) is indeed implementable
as it depends only on the observable of B. In contrast with the classical Principal-Agent litera-
ture, the filtered process X is not observable by the Principal and cannot be contracted upon. In
fact, in order to compute the filtered process X, one needs to observe the Agent’s control β to
compute the innovation process I given by (2.11) before solving the equation (4.3).
Proof Note that for any Z ∈ H2T ,
J¯P (Y0, Z) = E
β∗ [(BT − YT )] = Eβ∗
[(∫ T
0
(h(t)Xt + β
∗
t )dt−
∫ T
0
c(t, β∗t )dt
)]
− Y0
= Eβ
∗
[∫ T
0
(β∗t − c(t, β∗t )) dt
]
− Y0 +
∫ T
0
h(t)m(t)dt,
≤ Eβ∗
[∫ T
0
(
β¯∗t − c(t, β¯∗(t))
)
dt
]
−R+
∫ T
0
h(t)m(t)dt. (4.7)
We are going to show that β¯∗ is Agent’s optimal control associated to a contract ξ∗ ∈ Ξ. In
order for β¯∗ to be an optimal control, it follows from (4.4) that the processes Z∗ and P ∗ in the
forward-backward system must satisfy
Z∗t = ∂bc(t, β¯
∗(t))− V (h)h(t)P ∗t . (4.8)
Inserting the equality above into (4.2), we obtain
dPt = (h(t)∂bc(t, β¯
∗(t))− η(t)Pt)dt+QtdI β¯∗ , PT = 0.
This BSDE does have a unique solution given by
P ∗t = −
∫ T
t
e
∫ s
t
η(r)drh(s)∂bc(s, β¯
∗(s))ds, Q∗t = 0, t ∈ [0, T ].
Note that Q satisfies (4.5). Again by (4.8), we have
Z∗t = ∂bc(t, β¯
∗(t)) +
∫ T
t
e
∫ s
t
η(r)drh(s)∂bc(s, β¯
∗(s))ds,
which is a deterministic process. Further, there is a unique FB-adapted solution X¯∗ to the SDE
(2.8) with α ≡ 0. Using the process Z∗ and X¯∗, we immediately find an FB-adapted process
Y ∗ satisfying (4.1). So far, we find an FB-adapted solution (Y ∗, Z∗, P ∗, Q∗,X∗) to the forward-
backward system. Let ξ∗ be the contract defined by ξ∗ := Y ∗T , in other words, ξ
∗ satisfies (4.6).
Clearly, we have ξ∗ ∈ Ξ and β¯∗ is the corresponding Agent’s optimal control. Therefore, by
(4.7) and Ξ ⊂ Ξ ⊂ Ξ we obtain V¯P = VP .
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4.2 Mean Field Interacting Agents in Partially Observed Linear System
In our second application, we consider the Principal-Agent problem in the same partially ob-
served system but with N interacting Agents. As in Section 2.3, we denote Xˆ as the unobserv-
able process and B as the observable, both assumed to be 1-dimensional for simplicity. Agents
i = 1, · · · , n have private state processes (Xˆi, Bi) with dynamics
dBit = (h(t)λ¯
N
t Xˆ
i
t + β
i
t)dt+ dW
βi
t , B0 = 0,
where λ¯Nt =
1
N
∑N
1 B
i
t is the mean value of the observables at time t and Xˆ is the unique strong
solution of
dXˆit = η(t)Xˆ
i
tdt+ σ(t)dW
i
t , Xˆ0 = µ
i.
Here, W 1, · · · ,WN ,W β1 , · · · ,W βN are independent Brownian motions, and βi is the control
chosen by the Agent i. We assume that µ1, · · · , µN are independent Gaussian variables with
mean m0 and variance V0.
The Principal proposes the same contract ξ to all the Agents. Then the interacting agents
agree on a Nash equilibrium in which each Agent cannot improve his utility by deviating uni-
laterally.
The problem becomes very difficult in general because of the coupling. Note that the observ-
able process Bi for Agent i is no longer Gaussian and the filter of Xi, namely the conditional
law of Xi given Bi, is no longer described by a finite-dimensional process.
However, as the number of Agents N → ∞, we expect the system to become decoupled,
in which case we may be able to learn something about the Nash equilibrium from the corre-
sponding mean field game (MFG).
4.2.1 The Setting of Mean Field Interacting Agent Problem
As before, denote Xˆ the unique strong solution of the following linear stochastic differential
equation, which represents the unobservable part of the system.
dXˆt = η(t)Xˆtdt+ σ(t)dWt, X0 = µ.
Let λ ∈ C([0, T ],R) represent the observed population mean, for any β ∈ U , define
dPβ
dP
∣∣∣∣
FT
= exp
(∫ T
0
(h(t)λtXˆt + βt)dBt +
1
2
∫ T
0
(h(t)λtXˆt + βt)
2dt
)
.
By Girsanov theorem, the canonical process B satisfies the following stochastic differential
equation under Pβ:
dBt = (h(t)λtXˆt + βt)dt+ dW
β
t , B0 = 0, (4.9)
where W βt is a Brownian motion under P
β. Each Agent receives the payment ξ at the maturity
T of the contract and aims at optimizing his utility function:
VA(ξ, λ) = sup
Pβ∈P(λ)
Eβ
[
ξ − 1
2
∫ T
0
c(t, βt)dt
]
.
DenoteM∗(ξ, λ) the set of optimal controls of the Agent’s problem given the contract ξ and
the observed population mean λ. Define
Φ(ξ, λ) := {λ˜ : λ˜t = Eβ∗ [Bt] for all t ∈ [0, T ] and β∗ ∈ M∗(ξ, λ)}.
A mean field equilibrium is a fixed point of the map λ 7→ Φ(ξ, λ). Denote Θ(ξ) the set of
equilibria among the Agents when given the contract ξ satisfying the participation constraint,
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namely the Agent’s value should be above the reservation utility R. The Principal’s optimization
problem is given by
VP = sup
ξ∈Ξ
sup
λ∈Θ(ξ)
sup
β∗∈M∗(ξ,λ)
Eβ
∗
[BT − ξ]
with the convention sup ∅ = −∞.
Remark 4.6. As discussed in Elie, Mastrolia, Possama¨ı [13], we are only going to consider
contracts such that the Principal is able to compute the reaction of the Agents. In other words,
the set of contracts given which there is at least one Nash equilibrium among the Agents. Indeed,
the Principal needs to be able to anticipate how the Agents are going to react to the contracts
that he may offer, and will therefore not offer contracts for which Agents cannot agree on an
equilibrium.
4.2.2 The Agent’s Problem
For any fixed λ ∈ C([0, T ],R), the observable process B in (4.9) is a Gaussian process and
the Agent can compute the conditional mean and variance of the unobservable process (Xˆt)t≥0
using the Kalman filter. Denote as before Xt := E
β[Xˆt|FBt ] and Vt = Eβ[(Xˆt −Xt)2|FBt ].
Proposition 4.7. Let λ ∈ C([0, T ],R) be the observed population mean and β ∈ U . We have
the following filter system:

dXt = η(t)Xtdt+ h(t)V (t)λtdI
β
t X0 = m0,
dVt = (2η(t)V (t)− h2(t)V 2(t)λ2t + σ(t))dt V0 = V0, (4.10)
dBt = (h(t)λtXt + βt)dt+ dI
β
t B0 = 0,
where Iβ is the innovation process.
Using the filtered system, the Agent’s problem becomes fully observable. We now recall
the necessary and sufficient condition for the Agent’s problem in this specific case in the two
following propositions.
Proposition 4.8. Let λ ∈ C([0, T ],R) be the observed population mean. For a contract ξ ∈ Ξ,
let β∗ ∈ M∗(λ, ξ). Then the following FBSDE:

dYt = c(t, β
∗
t )dt+ ZtdI
β∗
t YT = ξ, (4.11)
dPt =
(
h(t)λtZt − (η(t)− V (t)h2(t)λ2t )Pt
)
dt+QtdI
β∗
t PT = 0,
dXt = η(t)Xtdt+ h(t)V (t)λtdI
β∗
t X0 = m0,
dBt = (h(t)λtXt + β
∗
t )dt+ dI
β∗
t B0 = 0, (4.12)
has a solution, denoted
(Y ∗, Z∗, P ∗, Q∗,X∗, B∗) ∈
(
H2T
(
Pβ
∗
))6
.
Besides, for all t ∈ [0, T ], for all b ∈ A, the optimal control β∗ must verify the local incentive
constraint:
(Z∗t + V (t)h(t)λtP
∗
t − β∗t )(b− β∗t ) ≤ 0. (4.13)
Proposition 4.9. Let (Y ∗, Z∗, P ∗, Q∗,X∗, B∗) be a solution to the system (4.11)-(4.12) with
β∗ satisfying (4.13). Define ξ := Y ∗T . Then β
∗ is an optimal control if for all t ∈ [0, T ],
0 ≤ Q
∗
t
2h(t)λt
≤ inf
b∈A
{
∂2bbc(t, b)
}
. (4.14)
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4.2.3 Solving the Principal’s Problem
Define the following subsets of H2T (P):
Z :=
{
Z : ∃Pβ ∈ P s.t. (4.11)-(4.12) with λ = E[B] have an FB-adapted solution (P,Q,X) in H2T (Pβ)3
}
,
Z :=
{
Z ∈ Z : Q satisfies (4.14)
}
,
and define
Ξ :=
{
YT |Y0 ≥ R,Z ∈ Z
}
and Ξ := {YT |Y0 ≥ R,Z ∈ Z} ,
where Y is defined by the equation (4.11). As before, we have Ξ ⊂ Ξ ⊂ Ξ and the enlarged
optimization of the Principal is given by
V¯P := sup
Y0≥R
sup
Z∈Z
J¯P (Y0, Z) := sup
Y0≥R
sup
Z∈Z
Eβ
∗
[BT − YT ] . (4.15)
Denote
k(t) := h(t)Eβ
∗
[Xt] = h(t)m0e
∫ t
0
η(s)ds and ρt = e
∫ T
t
k(s)ds − 1.
Theorem 4.10. Assume that Assumption 4.1 holds true and assume that ∂bc(t, ·) is surjective.
Denote β¯∗(t) = (∂bc(t, ·))−1(ρt+1). There exists an optimal contract for the Principal’s problem
in the mean field setting, which is given by
ξ∗ =
∫ T
0
c(t, β¯∗(t))dt+ (β¯∗(t)− V (t)h(t)B¯tPt)(dBt − h(t)B¯tX¯tdt),
where (X¯, B¯, V ) are solutions of the following system of forward equations:


dX¯t = η(t)X¯tdt+ h(t)V (t)B¯t(dBt − (h(t)B¯tX¯t + β¯∗(t))dt) X¯0 = m0, (4.16)
dB¯t
dt
= k(t)B¯t + β¯
∗
t B¯0 = 0, (4.17)
V˙ (t) = 2η(t)V (t)− h2(t)V 2(t)B¯2t + σ(t) V0 = V0. (4.18)
Proof For notation simplicity, denote
B¯t := E
β∗ [Bt], β¯t = E
β∗ [β∗t ].
By (4.12), at equilibrium we have
dB¯t
dt
= k(t)B¯t + β¯t. (4.19)
Replacing BT and YT = ξ in (4.15) by the representations in (4.11) and (4.12), we get
V¯P = −R+ sup
Z∈Z
Eβ
∗
[∫ T
0
(
h(t)B¯tXt + β
∗
t − c(t, β∗t )
)
dt
]
≤ −R+ sup
Z∈Z
{∫ T
0
(
k(t)B¯t + β¯t − c(t, β¯t)
)
dt
}
.
Notice that the inequality above becomes equality if and only if β∗ is deterministic.
Step 1. Solve the deterministic control problem
sup
β¯
{∫ T
0
(
k(t)B¯t + β¯t − c(t, β¯t)
)
dt
}
, (4.20)
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where B¯ satisfies (4.19). It follows from the Pontryagin maximum principle that the optimal
control β¯∗ is:
β¯∗(t) = (∂bc(t, ·))−1(ρt + 1), (4.21)
where ρ is the adjoint process:
dρt
dt
= −k(t)(ρt + 1), ρT = 0,
Step 2. V¯P is attained if the optimal control of the Agent is deterministic and is given by (4.21),
now we need to check if such a contract exists and belongs to Ξ.
Under the control β¯∗(t), the process B¯ follows:
dB¯t
dt
= k(t)B¯t + (∂bc(t, ·))−1(ρt + 1).
In order for β¯∗(t) to be the optimal control of the agent, by (4.13) we must have
Z∗t = (∂bc(t, ·))−1(ρt + 1)− V (t)h(t)B¯tPt.
Inserting the above equality into the equation of P and we get
dPt =
(
h(t)B¯tβ¯
∗(t)− η(t)Pt
)
dt+QtdI
β∗
t ,
and a trivial solution of the BSDE is given by (P¯ , 0), where P¯ is the solution of the ODE:
dP¯t
dt
= h(t)B¯tβ¯
∗(t)− η(t)P¯t with P¯T = 0.
So far we find a solution to the system (4.11)-(4.12). Define the contract:
ξ :=
∫ T
0
c(t, β¯∗(t))dt+ (β¯∗(t)− V (t)h(t)B¯tPt)(dBt − h(t)B¯tX¯tdt),
where X¯ is the solution of the following SDE:
dXt = η(t)Xtdt+ h(t)V (t)B¯t(dBt − (h(t)B¯tXt + β¯∗(t))dt), X0 = m0.
Clearly, β¯∗(t) is the best effort of the agent under the contract ξ, and the sufficient condition
for the Agent’s problem is verified since Q = 0, i.e. ξ ∈ Ξ. We conclude by using Theorem 2.10.
5 Appendix
In this section we shall detail the additional hypothesis and the proof of necessary condition for
the Agent’s problem in the case of exponential utility in the partially observed linear system.
The controlled system is given by (2.8)-(2.9). The Agent’s problem that we consider becomes
VA := sup
ν∈U
JA(ν) := sup
ν∈U
Eν
[
− exp
(
−λ
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
ct(νt)dt
))]
, (5.1)
To guarantee integrability, we shall need additional assumptions on the set of admissible
contracts. For convenience, we say that a strictly positive local martingale (Mt)t∈[0,T ] satisfies
the condition (H) if it is uniformly integrable and there exists p ∈ (1,∞) and Kp > 0 constant
depending only on p such that for every stopping time τ ,
KpE[M
1/p
T |Fτ ] ≥M1/pτ . (H)
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We recall that a contract ξ is implementable if there exists at least one optimal control for
the Agent’s problem. In the rest of the paper, we constrain our study on the following set of
contracts:
Ξ :=
{
ξ : VA(ξ) ≥ R and
(
Eν∗[exp(−λξ)|FBt ]
)
t∈[0,T ]
satisfied the condition (H)
}
, (5.2)
where ν∗ ∈ M∗(ξ).
Remark 5.1. 1. Let M be a martingale and denote E(M) the Dole´an-Dade exponential.
As given in the Corollary 3.4 in [19], E(M) satisfying the condition (H) is equivalent to
M ∈ BMO.
2. Let ξ ∈ Ξ and ν∗ be an optimal control of the Agent’s problem. For any control ν ∈ U ,
denote
Mt := E
ν∗
[
exp
(
−λ
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
cs(νs)ds
)) ∣∣∣FBt
]
.
Since ν is bounded, so is exp(λ
∫ T
0 cs(νs)ds). One can show easily that (Mt)t∈[0,T ] satisfies
the condition (H).
Define the Hamiltonian function:
Ht(x, a, b, p, q, z) :=
(
η(t)x + a− h(t)V (t)(h(t)x + b)
)
p−
(
h(t)x + b
)
z + ct(a, b) + λxqz.
Remark 5.2. Compared to the definition of the Hamiltonian functional given in (2.14), the
additional term λxqz in the above definition is due to the exponential utility in the Agent’s
problem. If the Agent is risk-neutral, i.e. λ = 0, this term disappears.
Now we can give the necessary condition for the Agent’s problem.
Theorem 5.3. For a contract ξ ∈ Ξ, let ν∗ ∈M∗(ξ). Then the following FBSDE

dYt =
(
ct(ν
∗
t ) +
1
2
λZ2t
)
dt+ ZtdI
ν∗
t YT = ξ, (5.3)
dPt = −∂xHt(Xt, ν∗t , Pt, Qt, Zt)dt+QtdIν
∗
t PT = 0, (5.4)
dXt = ∂pHt(Xt, ν
∗
t , Pt, Qt, Zt)dt+ h(t)V (t)dBt X0 = m0, (5.5)
with Iν
∗
defined as in (2.9), V defined as in (2.10) and
ν∗t = (α
∗
t , β
∗
t ) = argmin
(a,b)∈A
Ht(Xt, a, b, Pt, Qt, Zt),
has an F-adapted solution, denoted by
(Y ∗, Z∗, P ∗, Q∗,X∗) ∈ H2(Pν∗)×BMO ×H2(Pν∗)×H2(Pν∗)×H2(Pν∗).
Lemma 5.4. Let Pν1 and Pν2 be the two weak control of the Agent and Z a F-adapted process.
If
∫ ·
0 ZtdI
ν1
t ∈ BMO(Pν1), then
∫ ·
0 ZtdI
ν2
t ∈ BMO(Pν2).
Proof Denote X1 and X2 as the strong solution of the equation (2.8) given ν1 = (α1, β1) and
ν2 = (α2, β2), respectively. Denote ∆X := X2 −X1 and ∆β = β2 − β1. The change of measure
between Pν1 and Pν2 are given by
dPν2 = E
(∫ ·
0
(h(s)∆Xˆs +∆βs)dI
ν1
s
)
dPν1.
In particular, since the controls are bounded, the martingale (
∫ t
0 (h(s)∆Xˆs +∆βt)dI
ν1
s )t∈[0,T ] is
in BMO. We conclude by using the Theorem 3.8 in [19].
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In light of Lemma 5.4, without ambiguity, we say a FB-adapted process Z ∈ BMO if there
exists Pν ∈ P such that ∫ ·0 ZtdIνt ∈ BMO(Pν) .
Here we introduce a notation: for an FB-adapted process Z satisfying sufficient integrability
condition, we denote
Eν(Z) := E
( ∫ ·
0
ZtdI
ν
t
)
.
Proof of Theorem 5.3 As in the proof of Theorem 2.7, we start by assuming the existence of
an FB-adapted control ν∗ which optimises the Agent’s expected value under a given contract ξ.
We denote the corresponding state variable Xˆ∗.
Step 1. Introduce the dynamic version of the value function
Y˜t := E
ν∗
t
[
− exp
(
−λ
(
ξ −
∫ T
t
cs(ν
∗
s )ds
))]
.
One can check straightforward that (Mt)0≤t≤T :=
(
Y˜t exp
(
λ
∫ t
0 cs(ν
∗
s )ds
))
0≤t≤T
is an FB-
martingale under the probability Pν
∗
, and satisfies the condition (H) according to Remark 5.1.
By the martingale representation in Lemma 3.1, there exists an FB-adapted process Z˜, such
that for all t ∈ [0, T ]
Mt = VA(ν
∗) +
∫ t
0
Z˜sdI
v∗
s = VA(ν
∗) +
∫ t
0
MsZsdI
v∗
s , where Zt := −M−1t Z˜t (5.6)
Let Yt = − 1λ ln(−Y˜t). Then (5.3) follows from Itoˆ’s formula. Further, in view of (5.6) we obtain
Mt = VA(ν
∗)Eν∗(−λZ).
SinceM satisfies the condition (H), we have Z ∈ BMO according to Remark 5.1 and Eν∗(−λZ)
is a uniformly integrable Pν
∗
-martingale.
Step 2. Next we perform a variational calculus around the optimal control ν∗. We shall use the
same notation as in the proof of Theorem 2.7. Note that ∆Xˆ satisfies the following stochastic
differential equation:
d∆Xˆt =
[
(η(t)− V (t)h2(t))∆Xˆt +∆αt − V (t)h(t)∆βt
]
dt.
Since JA(ν
∗) = VA = −e−λY0 , we have
JA(ν
ǫ) = Eν
ǫ
[
JA(ν
∗)Eνǫ(−λZ) exp
(
−λ
(∫ T
0
−δct(ν∗t ) + ǫZt(h(t)∆Xˆt +∆βt)dt
))]
.(5.7)
Define dP¯ν
ǫ
:= Eνǫ(−λZ)dPνǫ and denote E¯νǫ the expectation under P¯νǫ . Applying the
Taylor expansion on the exponential function in (5.7), we have
JA(ν
ǫ)
JA(ν∗)
= E¯ν
ǫ
[
1− ǫλ
(∫ T
0
−∂αct(ν∗t )∆αt − ∂βct(ν∗t )∆βt + Zt(h(t)∆Xˆt +∆βt)dt
)
+RεT
]
,
where
RεT := (δct(ν∗t )−∂αct(ν∗t )δαt−∂βct(ν∗t )δβt)+
∞∑
n=2
(−1)nǫnλn
n!
(∫ T
0
−δct(ν∗t ) + Zt(h(t)∆Xˆt +∆βt)dt
)n
.
(5.8)
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Define dP¯ν
∗
:= Eν∗(−λZ)dPν∗, E¯ν∗ the expectation under P¯ν∗ , and denote I¯∗t := I∗t +
∫ t
0 λZsds.
We claim and will prove in Step 3 that limε→0 E¯
ν∗ [|RεT |]/ε2 <∞. Then,
JA(ν)
JA(ν∗)
− 1 = ǫλE¯νǫ
[∫ T
0
(
∂αct(ν
∗
t )∆αt − (Zt − ∂βct(ν∗t ))∆βt − Zth(t)∆Xˆt
)
dt
]
+O(ǫ2).
The construction of the costate process (P,Q) and the variational calculus is the same as step
3 and step 4 of the proof of Theorem 2.7. We shall leave them to the readers.
Step 3. Finally we shall complete the proof by proving the claim we made on RεT . The
first term in (5.8) is clearly uniformly bounded by Cǫ2 for some positive constant C, since the
controls are bounded. Since the controls are bounded, using the Ho¨lder inequality and the
energy inequalities given in [22, Chapter VII-6], we have
E¯ν
∗
[|RεT |] ≤ Cε2 +
∞∑
n=2
ǫnλn
n!
(
Cn1 + C
n
2 E¯
ν∗
[
E
(∫ T
0
ǫ(h(t)∆Xˆt +∆βt)dI¯
∗
t
)(∫ T
0
|Zt|dt
)n])
≤ Cε2 +
∞∑
n=2
ǫnλn
n!

Cn1 + Cn2C3E¯ν∗
[(∫ T
0
Z2t dt
)n]1/2
≤ Cε2 +
∞∑
n=2
ǫnλn
n!
(
Cn1 + C
n
2C3
√
n!||Z||nBMO(P¯ν∗ )
)
= O(ǫ2).
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